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POSITION OF LABOR IN GEORGIA

Georgia has no uniform system of laws pertaining to industrial relations. The statutes which have been passed are
designed primarily to serve a threefold purpose-to guarantee to the individual employee the fullest freedom in exercising his right to work, to protect the rights of employers
in any lawful business, and to maintain peace and order in
industrial disputes. The state laws, as a whole, follow a
public policy somewhat resembling the doctrine of laissezfaire, with the scales tipped definitely in favor of the employer. There are no state laws patterned after the National
Labor Relations Act,' the Federal Anti-Injunction Act
(Norris-LaGuardia),' or the Fair Labor Standards Act.3
No affirmative action seems to have been taken by the state
to foster the growth of labor organizations, but, on the
other hand, most of the laws are of a restrictive character,
in respect to labor at least.
There is no state law establishing a minimum wage for
intrastate industries not covered by the national wage and
hour law,' or regulating the hours of female employment,'
except as hereinafter pointed out. There are miscellaneous
provisions in the Georgia Code regulating the hours of
labor in particular industries and also provisions regulating
child labor within the state.6 Employers are prohibited from
making contracts with employees for a work week exceeding sixty hours, with certain exceptions, in all cotton and
woolen manufacturing establishments in the state.' There
is another section in the Code which provides for the maximum hours of railroad employees operating trains.' The
provisions limiting the hours of labor in cotton and woolen
manufacturing establishments apply equally to male and
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female employees. This seems to be the only law affecting
the working hours of female employees. However, there is
a Code provision which requires employers in "manufacturing, mechanical, or mercantile establishments" to furnish
seats to female employees, and to permit their use by such
employees when they are not actually engaged in work.'
Aside from the provisions of the Georgia Code relating
primarily to the general welfare of its citizens and those in
the nature of police laws, the position of labor in the state
can best be determined by looking into and examining the
laws which more directly affect the processes of collective
bargaining, such as the statutes affecting picketing, union
security agreements, and the like. Labor organizations have
long looked upon union security agreements as one of the
favorite devices for securing the benefits of collective bargaining. In Georgia, the traditional union security contracts
("closed" and "union" shop agreements) are declared to
be against the public policy of the state." Although the
National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) permits "union
shop" agreements, it allows the states to make more rerestrictive laws governing union security agreements. 2
Thus, while the national law permits "union shop" agreements, it leaves the way clear for the states to wipe them
9. GA. CODE § 54-401 (1933).
10. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-902,54-904 (Supp. 1947) ; Act No. 140, Ga.
L. 1947, p. 618, §§ 2, 4.
11. Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (a) (3) (June 23, 1947)
29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (Supp. 1948). This Section provides in
substance that a "union" contract is permitted, provided that the
union has not been aided by the employer in establishing itself as
the bargaining agent of the employees; that the union has been
certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the bargaining
agent in accordance with the most recent election; and that the
employee may become a member "on or after the thirtieth day
following the beginning of . . . employment or the effective date
of such agreement, whichever is the later." An employer is not
justified in dismissing an employee in accordance with a "union"
contract except for non-pa'yment of membership dues or initiation
fees.
12. Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (b) (June 23, 1947)
29 U.S.C. § 164 (b) (Supp. 1948).
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out altogether. This is a very serious blow to labor and to
collective bargaining, for it permits the states to pass laws
which have the practical effect of so restricting labor organizations in their freedom of contract that collective bargaining agreements may be subject to the mercy of employers. During a period of widespread unemployment, a
labor organization would have no standing whatsoever,
since management could defeat the union by unrestricted
hiring of prospective employees, whether they are union
members or not. The policy of the Federal Government as
enunciated by its present labor laws, plus the authority conferred upon the states to legislate concerning union security,
are a far cry from the national policy announced by the
Federal Anti-Injunction Act or the Wagner Act.
The Georgia "closed-shop" law provides that it shall be
against the public policy of the state for an employer and a
labor organization to enter into any agreement whereby it
is made "a condition of employment, or of continuance of
employment" that an individual be or become a member of
a labor organization. The same statute prohibits agreements
between an employer and an employee which require the
employee "to refrain from membership . . . in a labor or-

ganization," during the term of his employment. 3 Thus,
the Georgia law works two ways. It prohibits. agreements
requiring membership in a labor organization, and also prohibits agreements to refrain from membership, or what are
commonly known in labor circles as "yellow dog" contracts,
as a condition for, or continuance of, employment.
State anti-closed shop laws have recently been under attack in the Supreme Court of the United States. North
Carolina has a statute which is substantially the same as
the Georgia law," and Nebraska adopted a constitutional
amendment to the same effect. 5 In a recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court it was held that both the
North Carolina statute and the Nebraska constitutional
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-902,54-904 (Supp. 1947) ; Act No. 140, Ga.
L. 1947, p. 618, §§ 2, 4.
14. Laws N.C. 1947, c. 328, § 2.
15. NEB. CONST. Art. XV, § 13 (1946).
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amendment were valid; that they did not abridge freedom
of speech or the right to assemble and petition for a redress
of grievances; that they were not a denial of equal protection of the laws or due process of law; and that they did
not violate the prohibition against impairment of obligation of contract." Under this decision, it seems that there
is no doubt as to the constitutionality of the Georgia anticlosed shop law, or to any future state or territorial law
prohibiting union security agreements and passed in accord-.
ance with the authority conferred upon the states by the
Taft-Hartley Law.
In Georgia, picketing is rather strictly regulated. The
Supreme Court of the United States has declared that
picketing is an expression of free speech, and as such is protected by the Federal Constitution." The doctrine of this
case, however, has been limited by a later decision of that
Court which held that picketing is more than an expression
of free speech and has in it an "element of coercion."'" In
the light of this case, it is difficult to say what category
picketing will eventually fall into. It seems, however, that
as long as it is peaceful and free from threats or intimidation, it will continue to be treated as an expression of free
speech protected by the Federal Constitution. Like freedom
of speech, however, the right to picket is not an absolute
one but must be exercised reasonably and for a legitimate
purpose. In Georgia, it has been held that though picketing
is protected as free speech, the slightest evidence of violence will make it unlawful and subject to injunction." The
only means permitted in picketing are those which appeal to
and leave the mind free to act of
the reason and judgment
0
its own free will.'
16. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525, 69 S. Ct. 251, 93 L. Ed. 201 (1949).
17. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093
(1940).
18. See Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S. Ct.
684, 93 L. Ed. 649 (1949).
19. Jones v. Van Winkle Gin & Machine Works, 131 Ga. 336, 62 S.E.
236, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 848, 127 Am. St. Rep. 235 (1908).
20. McMicheal v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, 108 S.E. 226, 26
A.L.R. 149 (1921).
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Mass picketing in Georgia is prohibited outright when it
interferes with or obstructs, in any way, the free entrance to
or egress from any place of employment, whether such entrance or egress is public or private.2' Violation of this
statute is subject to injunction. 2 Independently of statute, it
has been said that mass picketing, in itself, will amount to
intimidation, and as such would be subject to injunction. 3
The right to join a labor union and the question of
whether to join in a strike are left strictly up to the individual, 2 and the use of any kind of force or intimidation
is subject to injunction under Georgia law.2
An employer and a labor organization are also prohibited
in Georgia from entering into agreements requiring the employer to deduct union dues from the wages of employees,
unless the employee voluntarily requests that such a deduction be made.2 1 Such an arrangement is revocable at the will
of the employee. Under the statute, such an agreement
would seem to be void even with the solicited consent of the
employee, since it requires his voluntary act and not merely
his passive consent. In any case, facts showing any undue
persuasion would make the agreement void. This statute is
in line with the policy of the Taft-Hartley Act, which prohibits the employer from deducting membership dues in
accordance with a collective bargaining agreement unless
the employee gives his written consent. Willful violation
of this statute will subject the offender to a fine of not more
than $10,000.00, or imprisonment for not more than one
GA. CoDE ANN. § 54-S03 (Supp. 1947) ; Act No. 141 Ga. L. 1947,
p. 620, § 3.
22. Pedigo v. Celanese Corp. of America, 205 Ga. 392, 54 S.E. 252
(1949), cert. devied . ..... U.S .... , 70 S. Ct. 345 . ..... L. Ed .......

21.

(1950).
23. Ibid.
24. G-'. CODE ANN. § 54-804 (Supp. 1947) Act.
p. 621 § 4.
25. G'. CODE ANN. § 54-905 (Supp. 1947) ; Act
p. 621 § 5.
26. GA. CODE ANN. § 54-906 (Supp. 1947) Act
p. 618 § 6.
27. Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §
1947) ; 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (4) (Supp. 1948).

No. 141, Ga. L. 19-17,
No. 141, Ga. L. 1947,
No. 140, Ga. L. 1947,
302 (c) (4) (June 23,
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year, or both. 8 Violation of the Georgia statute is subject
to injunction, plus any other available remedy.29
Georgia also has a law which makes it a misdemeanor
for any one or more persons to assemble near a place of
business for the purpose of preventing, by force or violence,
any person from engaging in a lawful vocation." Arkansas
has a similar statute,"' which was upheld in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, as not
abridging the freedom of speech or assemblage or denying
due process of law. 2
As far as the police laws of the State are concerned, there
are no undue restrictions on the rights and privileges of
labor organizations in carrying on the functions of collective bargaining. Laws against violence, intimidation,
mass picketing as tending toward violence, and other similar measures are all designed to preserve peace and order
within the state. Passage of such laws has always been within the province of the police power of any sovereign or
quasi-sovereign state. But in other measures which are outside the orbit of ordinary police power, the public policies
of the state regarding health, general welfare, and the like
are formulated. It seems that the public policy of Georgia
in regard to labor and labor disputes is, on the whole, of
a purely restrictive nature. No statutes can be found which
affirmatively protect employee organizations in their efforts
to secure higher wages and better working conditions, but
the laws in effect seem to restrict those organizations within certain bounds, in order to protect the individual in certain abstract rights, such as the right to work whether a
member of a labor organization or not, the right to join or
refrain from joining a labor organization, and other simi28. Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., lst Sess. § 302(d) (June 23, 1947);
29 U.S.C. § 186(d) (Supp. 1948).
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 54-908 (Supp. 1947); Act No. 140, Ga. L. 1947,
p. 618 § 6.
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 54-802 (Supp. 1947) ; Act No. 141, Ga. L. 1947,
p. 620 § 2.
31. Acts Ark. 1943, Act No. 193 § 2.
32. Cole v. State of Arkansas, . ..... U.S ....... , 70 S. Ct. 172, 94 L. Ed.
139 (1949).
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lar individual rights. The laws of the state definitely reflect
the public opinion of the people, which is, for the present
at least, anti-union, though the people themselves are in
favor of higher wages and better working conditions. Occurrence of widespread strikes following World War II
and the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act have combined to
create, to a large extent, an anti-union sentiment. The widespread publicity given to the requirement of the Taft-Hartley Act that officials of labor organizations had to sign
anti-Communist affidavits before their unions could take
advantage of the agencies created under the Act, also
helped create this general distrust of labor unions. It is
apparent that the laws of the State reflect the general sentiment expressed by the Federal legislation, as embodied in
the Taft-Hartley Act.
J. CARLTON IVEY

